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What Is
This Thing
Called Hearsay
By JOHN W. REED

This article is based on an address delivered
at the 1956 Advocacy Institute at the University
of Michigan. A re-examination of elementary
principles, the discussion proceeds on the express assumption that much of the uncertainty
and confusion in usa of the hearsay rule is
unnecessary because it is due to failure to
recall and employ these principles.

The hearsay rule, elementary as it is,
merits periodic re-examination by judges
and practicing lawyers lest first principles be lost from view. Application
of the rule without conscious regard
to its purpose is likely to produce enough
aberrant results to make one feel unsure
of his grasp of the whole of this important subject. That the hearsay problem
is important and pervasive all would
concede. Although it may be an excess
of enthusiasm to say with James Bradley Thayer that this "great head of the
law of evidence . . . [comprises] ....

with its exceptions, much the largest
part of all that truly belongs there," it
is nevertheless true that the possibility
of hearsay lurks in every law suit.
Despite the pervasive presence of
hearsay problems, it seems clear that
in a considerable number of instances
which can be said to involve hearsay,
trial counsel fail to note the exclusion

possibility. This is not to say that in
general more and more evidence should
be excluded; probably the exclusionary
rules of evidence are applied somewhat
too vigorously already. But if there is a
(rational) reason for excluding hearsay
evidence, it may be as applicable to
the obscure and irregular instances as
to the obvious cases.
Further, some lawyers do not state
the hearsay objection adequately even
when recognizing the presence of the
forbidden testimony. Apparently the%,
fail because they do not understand the
true basis of the hearsay rule. Objections like this are common: "The statement was not made in my client's presence and is not binding on him." "The
evidence is self-serving." These do not
properly present the hearsay objection.
The fact that a statement was not made
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in the opponent's presence is not controlling; neither is its self-serving nature.
Out-of-court declarations may be admissible even though self-serving and out
of the hearing of the opponent: e.g.,
spontaneous exclamations, declarations
of present state of mind or emotion,
and-even more familiar-business entries. Indeed, to urge these objections
is to urge no objections at all. They
suggest that the objector does not really
understand the hearsay rule. One could
argue that in some circumstances the
meaning of such an objection (selfserving; out of hearing of opponent)
can be inferred-that it is a shorthand
expression of a hearsay objection plus
a claim of inapplicability of a particular
exception (not yet urged by the proponent). For example, if the question
clearly called for hearsay and the only
possible exception would be an admission, the fact that the statement was
self-serving would nip the exception in
the bud. So also if the declaration were
offered as the foundation for an admission by silence (an adoptive admission),
the fact that the statement was not
heard by the opponent would excuse
his silence and so render the exception
inapplicable. But in each instance there
is no objection to the fact that the question calls for hearsay, unless somehow
it be implied. And implied objections
are not carried in the briefcase of the
wise and able lawyer. The fact cannot
be blinked that no hearsay objection
has been expressed-an omission which
may mislead a trial court and be fatal
on appeal.
A Tentative Definition
Now, what is the hearsay rule? Or,
more accurately, what is hearsay? A
definition is hard to formulate. At least,
a really helpful definition is hard to
formulate. If it is broad enough to cover
all cases, then it is so general as to be
virtually meaningless in some of the
harder cases. And simplification in this
area is falsification. But difficult or not,
we had better try, so that we may have
something of a common starting point.
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Let's try this definition-for the moment, at least:
Hearsay evidence is evidence of a
statement made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
which is offered to prove the truth
of the matter stated. [This, essentially,
is Rule 63 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence.]
Such a statement (i.e., one not made
on the witness stand), being offered to
prove the truth of the matter therein,
rests for its value on the credibility of
the asserter, who is not now testify,ing. There are many questions about this
definition, but the two big ones, closely
related, are these:
1) What do we mean lyi a "stateIent"?
2) When is a statement being offered
to prove the truth of the matter
stated?
The answers to
best be discovered
tion of what are
to be the bases of
say evidence.

these questions can
by a brief examinacommonly supposed
our hostility to hear-

Defects of Hearsay: Two False,
One True
1) The first defect of hearsay evidence is said to be that it is likely to
be inaccurate since it is second-hand or
worscP The possible error in transmission
of the original declarant's story through
intermediaries makes us reluctant to accept it as a basis of decision. In this
view, the hearsay rule is something like
a "best evidence rule," where, indeed,
Thayer classified it.
This basis for the rule is commonly
discounted by noting that a declaration
carefully reduced to writing and carefully preserved and presented to the
court is no less hearsay than the most
carelessly reported oral declaration.
Therefore, the possibility of inaccuracy
is not itself a sufficient explanation of
the hearsay objection.

HeinOnline -- 36 Mich. St. B.J. 18 1957

MICInCAN STATE BAR JOURNAL

19

2) The second defect of hearsay evidence is said to be that it is evidence
of a statement not under oath. Wigmore
dismisses this defect rather quickly by'
noting that sworn statements by a deelarant are none the less hearsay when
offered by another to prove the truth
of the statement. One of the hardest
lessons for a law student to learn is
that an affidavit is hearsay notwithstanding the oath. Professor McCormick argues that the oath requirement should
not be lightly dismissed, even though,
obviously, it is not the only requirement.
But I incline to agree with Dean Wigmore that the oath is virtually without significance here. Perhaps it would
be more accurate to say that tle oath is
but a mechanical manifestation or incident of what, all would agree, is the
prime defect of hearsay evidence:
3) The lack of opportunity to crossexamine the declarant whose out-of-court
statement is reported by the witness.
Our legal literature is filled with encomiums of cross-examination as a device
for establishing truth and confounding
error. It may be doubted that deliberate
falsification is often exposed in actual
practice, but it sometimes is. And crossexamination does provide a good opportunity to expose bins and faults in
perception and memory of the witness.
If the deelarant is not on the stand,
these shortcomings in his testimonial capacity cannot be well demonstrated, and
we are reluctant to listen to the story
thus told second-hand. (I say' reluctant,
rather than unwilling, because we do let
in many such statements under the
numerous exceptions to the rule. Indeed,
many cases are decided primarily on the
basis of hearsay evidence so admitted.)

as requiring cross-examination, it is first
cousin to it, because all of this relates
to the credibility evaluation which the
jury is to make.

Also under this head comes the oath
requirement, because in any case where
the declarant is on the stand to make
his declaration and to be cross-examined
he is under oath. Here too belongs the
requirement that the jury be enabled
to view the demeanor of the declarant
and so to evaluate more accurately the
story he tells. If it is not the same thing

In addition to testing "willingness" to
tell the truth, one may want to test
"ability" to tell the truth. That is to

In short, in an adversary system of
litigation, where counsel are under no
obligation to prove matters which establish the opponent's case, we distrustand rightly so-any statements which
depend for their credit on a person not
available for cross-examination. Our distrust is so great that we have set up
the hearsay rule to exclude evidence
of such statements. The Michigan court
has subscribed to this general vie", that
the lack of cross-examination is the basic
fault, is the real fault, of hearsay
evidence.
If, then, at any point we want to
cross-examine a declarant to test the
reliability of his declaration and we do
not have that opportunity, it follows
that evidence of his declaration is hearsay' evidence.
Purposes of Cross-Examination
A generalized statement of the purposes of cross-examination is that it may
be used to test a witness' willingness to
tell the truth and his ability to tell the
truth. "Willingness" means his sincerity,
his good faith, his truthfulness. Is he
a liar or is he truthful? Does he stick
to what he knows, or does he embroider
the fact with a bit of fancy? We insist
that opposing counsel be given an opportunity to test this characteristic of a
person whose statement is offered, and
such an opportunity is not available
when the declarant, the relator, is not
reporting directly. Indirect reporting of
his story is hearsay.

say, much false or misleading testimony
comes not from a will to falsify, but
rather from inadvertent misstatement,
bias, inaccuracy of observation, faintness
of recollection, and-occasionally-from
limited ability to communicate what he
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knows (illustratively, limited or mistaken
vocabulary). Again, to probe for the
truth among these possibilities for error,
cross-examination is needed, and we prefer to exclude the story of one who is

not on the stand and subject to crossexamination. (Anticipating what is discussed more fully below, I may wari
that there is no unanimity on the question whether a declaration is converted
into hearsay by the opponent's frustrated
desire to cross-examine nof for sincerity
or willingness to tell the truth, but for
ability, e.g., accuracy of observation,
alone. Michigan cases do not furnish a
clear answer, although a case of fifty
years ago contains language suggesting
that hearsay evidence is objectionable
because the opponent is denied opportunity to cross-examine both for the
"veracity and competency" of
the declarant. If in context "competency" can
be equated with testimonial "ability,"
then it may be argued that Michigan
would hold a declaration hearsay where
the only conceivable reason for crossexamining would be to test the declarant's power to perceive accurately.)
To repeat: If we want to crossexamine the maker of a statement to
check the "reliability" of his statement,
and we do not have that opportunity,
it follows that evidence of the statement
is hearsay evidence. If it is to be admitted, it is only because it fits one of
the exceptions or because opposing counsel waives his objection to it.
Examples of Non-Hearsay
This simple principle makes it rather
easy to identify the common cases of
statements that are not hearsay, because
if the making of a statement is significant, is material, in the lawsuit without
regard to the credibility of the declarant
and without regard to the quality of his
perception and the like, then a witness
may testify to the making of that statement and no hearsay is involved. Three
familiar examples illustrate the point:
In a slander suit, plaintiff calls Witness to prove that defendant said, "Plain-

tiff is a thief." This is not hearsay
because we have no need to crossexamine defendant. We are not trying
to prove the truth of th statement.
Indeed, it is necessarily assumed in a
slander action that it is false. The statement does not depend for its credit on
defendant, the declarant. The question
is: Was it said? The sincerity and testimonial ability elements here all relate
to Witness, who heard it, who now
reports it, and who is subject to crossexamination.

A second example is statements of
offer and acceptance in entering into a
contract. When Witness (W) reports
that plaintiff said, "I offer ten shares
at a thousand dollars," and that defendant responded, "I accept," there is no
need to cross-examine the speakers,
plaintiff and defendant. These statements
do not depend for their credit on the
jury's evaluation of the credibility and
reliability of plaintiff and defendant.
They depend on the accuracy of W's
report. It is I's credibility which needs
to be evaluated. Did IV hear accurately?
Does W remember accurately? Does IV
mean what he just said? Is he telling
the truth? Is he a friend of plaintiff's?
These questions all relate to W, and he
is on the stand, under oath, telling his
story directly, and subject to crossexamination. This is not hearsay.
A third example of non-hearsay declarations is statements by which the
declarant gives notice of some kind to
his hearer. Testimony by W that he
heard the plaintiff-insured give notice
of the burning of his house to his insurance company is not hearsay to prove
that notice was given, since we are not
concerned about the insured's credibility. We do not need to cross-examine
him at this point. The question is, did
he say certain words-not: were they
true? Simply: did lie say them? IV is
direct witness to this fact, and fully
meets the requirement of being subject
to cross-examination. (If we were seek-

ing by this means to prove not notice
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but rather the burning of the house,
then of course IV's testimony that plaintiff said his house burned would be
hearsay on that issue.)
These are the easy eases of no,hearsay, and every lawyer knows dozens
more like them.

Easy Examples of Hearsay:
Assertive Conduct
We turn now to instances of hearsay,
to situations in which cross-examination
is legitimately desired. We canl start
with the easy and obvious case: the
case where a declarant's statement is
offered, second-hand, to prove the truth
of what he said. (McCormick says: to
prove declarant's belief that it is true.)
For example:
Criminal charge of burglary against
defendant. I say to you that defendant
was the burglar. You are called as witness to report my statement. Clearly
this is hearsay to prove that defendant

is the burglar.
Civil action for personal injury by

plaintiff against defendant. I say to you
that defendant entered the intersection
against the red light. You are called as
witness to report my statement. Clearly
this is hearsay. Plaintiff's lawyer will
want to know all about me and my
story: Did I see the accident? Am I
confused as to which defendant was
driving? Am I color-blind? Am I
related to plaintiff? When I said "defendant," did I mean defendant? Could
I see the light and defendants car
simultaneously? And so on. Of course
the lawyer wants to cross-examine, and
of course this is hearsay evidence. Indeed, this is elementary.
Equally elementary is the case'of nonverbal conduct which is intended by the
actor to serve as an assertion. Testimony
to his observed conduct is hearsay. For
example, if in the burglary case of a
moment ago, instead of my saying "Defendant was the burglar," you ask me
who the burglar was and I point to
defendant, then your testimony as to
my pointing is hearsay evidence. It is

BAR
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exactly as if I had said, "Defendant was
the burglar." The test is: Was there
a communication intended? Whether it
is verbal or non-verbal makes no
difference.
Even silence may be communcative.
That is to say, a comnmunication may
be inferred from it. Illustrative is the
idea of adoptive admissions: Where
Jones is accused of something under
circumstances in which, we say, it is
"normal" for him to (Icily it if it isn't
true, his failure to deny is treated as
an assertion by hit,' that it is true.
Similarly, on the issue of unwvholesomeness of food served, the silence of all
others served vith the same food is
sometimes treated as hearsay evidence
of non-injury or non-illness on the part
of the other customers, as if there were
assertions of non-injury. Clearly, nonverbal conduct can be communicative,
and if offered to prove the truth of the
coimunication, it nus afoul the hearsay
rule.
Hard Examples of Hearsay:
Non-Assertive Conduct

But consider the case where the socalled declarant was not declaring or
intending to communicate anything to
anybody. He simply was talking to him self, or grasping his injured ankle, or
locking the windows in his home. Can
there possibly be hearsay in such circumstances? Although it would be much
simpler if we could say no, the cases
suggest that sometimes the .answer is
yes. Precisely here is the difficult
problem.
\We think of the hearsay objection
as based oii the need for cross-examination. And we think of cross-examination
as an engine for testing the truthfulness
of an observer. When such an observer
asserts something as true, \w'e want to
cross-examine him to probe the depth
of that truth. On the s'urface, at least,
it would seem to follow that only when
a person asserts something can there be
any question of his truthfulness. It is
difficult to think of truth versus falsity
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in a man who is talking to himself, or
who is acting without the consciousness
that he is observed. He is not trying to
assert anything to anybody. Crossexamination, it would seem, can accomplish nothing by way of probing the
sincerity of a person who is seeking
to communicate with no one.
But what will you do with this case:
The sanity of X, a testator, is in issue.
Y, who has known X for many years,
promised at about the time of the execution of the will to marry X. Would it
occur to you that there is any hearsay
problem involved in proving the marriage promise as evidence of X's sanity?
Here is a better one: As bearing on
X's insanity, evidence is offered as to
the precautions of X's family for his
safety and the like. Is there conceivably
a hearsay problem there?
And another one: On the issue of the
seaworthiness of a ship, evidence is
offered that the deceased captain, after
examining every part of the vessel, embarked in it with his entire family? How
is there a hearsay question in this?
The Opening of Pandora's Box
The landmark case on this problem is
Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, and these
illustrations are based on that famousor infamous-case. In brief the facts of
Wright v. Tatham were these: In an
ejectment suit against a devisee of John
Marsden, the plaintiff, who was an heir
at law of Marsden, alleged that Marsden
lacked testamentary capacity. Seeking to
prove that Marsden was, on the contrary,
entirely competent, the defendant offered
in evidence several letters written to
Marsden by different persons, all of
whom were likewise deceased by this
time. Three of the letters related to
matters of business and were of a kind
which, presumably, would be sent only
to one able to comprehend and to engage in ordinary business transactions.
The fourth was personal, contained family news and expressions of affection,
and was of a kind which, presumably,

BAn JOURNAL

would not be sent to an insane person.
Defendant, offering these letters, was
unable to establish that old man Marsden had acted on them, or even read
them. The case ranged up and down
the English courts for several years,
with two trials and numerous appeals,
finally ending with a decision of the
House of Lords. The decision usually
cited is that in one of the Exchequer
Chamber hearings (7 A. & E. 313,
112 Eng. Repr. 488 [1837]), and in
particular the opinion of Baron Parke.
(Incidentally, Sir Frederick Pollock was
defendant's lawyer. With both Baron
Parke and Sir Frederick working on the
case, it is not surprising that history
was made.) The holding which finallv
emerged was that the letters which had
been written to Marsden were inadmissible as hearsay.
Defendant's counsel, Pollock, argued
that the "treatment" of Marsden by his
friends was circumstantial, relevant evidence of sanity. But the court held
othervise. If there had been some action by Marsden in carrying on social
intercourse with these friends, that
would be something else again-as, for
example, if Marsden had made a purchase from old friend Smythe, or if
Marsden had consulted with his lawyer,
or if Marsden had entertained his neighbors, and, all of these things had been
done as by a normal person, that evidence would be admissible. But that
was not the case here. The evidence
was letters from friends and business
acquaintances written in a fashion indicating that the letter writers believed
Marsden was sane. Said Baron Parke,
"... proof of a particular fact which
is not of itself a matter of issue, but
which is relevant only as implying a
statement or opinion of a third person on the matter In issue, is inadmissible in all cases where such a
statement or opinion not on oath
would be of itself inadmissible."
In other words, these letters themselves
were not in issue; only as they were
offered as a basis for inferring the writ-
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ers' opinions of Marsden's sanity were
they relevant. Had one of these letter
\riters said or written to a friend, "I
think old Marsden is sane," obviotisly
the friend could not testify to tile statement; it would be hearsay beyond any
question. Wright v. Tatham says that
when some action-here, writing letters
of a particular kind-is used as a basis
for inferring the opinion of the actor,
and tile action is not otherwise relevant,
then the action is hearsay to prove the
opinion. The vriting of a normal communciation to Marsden is equated with
the writers statement. "I think Marsden
is still sane." Before we will let that
come in, we want to cross-examine the
writer.
It should be borne in mind that, for
all anyone knows, the letter writers were
not trying to assert anything whatever
about Marsden's sanity. They were not
trying to say, "We think Marsden is
sane." Clearly there is no problem of
their truthfulness or sincerity. How then,
can there be any need for cross-examination? The answer lies in the fact,
mentioned earlier, that there are elements other than truthfulness that may
be probed on cross-examination. The
opportunity to observe, for example:
How recently had the letter writers seen
old Marsden, and therefore how accurate is the appraisMi of him which we
infer has been made and expressed?
Adequacy of communication to tile tribunal, for example: Is it possible that
the writers knew that Marsden was failing but that they wrote "letters as usual"
to keep up his spirits? Could we discover these things by cross-examination
of the writers? Would we like to try?
In other words, if we accept the notion that it is legitimate to use crossexamination to probe testimonial ability
as well as testimonial sincerity, thenbecause the hearsay rule is designed to
safeguard the right to cross-examination
-the hearsay rule applies to block evidence of actions and statements which,
though not intended to be assertive, are

23

used to indicate what tile actor would
have asserted had we asked him about
it.
What then, are the answers to tile
problem cases of a few moments ago?
Under Wright v. Tatham, Y's agreement
to marry X would be hearsay evidence
of her opinion of X's sanity. Under
Wright v. Tatham, the precautions taken
by X's family would be hearsay evidence
of their opinion of X's sanit), (or lack
of it). Under Wright v. Tatham, the embarkation of the captain and his family,
after inspection of tile ship would be
hearsay evidence of his expert opinion
of the seaworthiness of the ship.
Perhaps, too, the silence cases fit in
here-the cases which appeared rather
simple in the discussion above: The silence of other consumers of foodstuffs
may be hearsay evidence as to wholesomeness. And we infer an assertion in
the case of the one who is silent in the
face of an accusation; such a case is
regularly held hearsay without even a
tip-of-the-hat to Wright v. Tatharn.
One might go to a ludicrous extreme
and suggest that on the issue of whether
it is cold outside, it would be hearsay
to testify that a stranger was observed1
walking along, bundled up in his coat,
rubbing his ears, and the like. His actions hearsay to prove it was cold? Why
so? Because we are equating his conduct
with an assertion by him of his belief
that it is cold, and we want to crossexamine him to inquire whether he has
any disease or physical peculiarity which
makes him react to temperatures differentlh from most of us, or whether he
is a walking advertisement for a local
clothier trying to drum up overcoat business by reminding people that winter
is on tile way. There are some cases
almost in point.
Ludicrous? Yes, even ridiculous. Yet
this point is almost on the borderline of
hearsay, and it is helpful to know that
tile theory of the rule may go this far,
for then the typical case, lying nearer
the center of things, will be much more
easily understood.
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Strangely there has been no full-dress
judicial review of the problem exemplified by Wright v. Tatham in the century
since, One can say only that there is
no reason to believe that there has yet
been a significant withdrawal from its
principles.
A Clutch of Prophecies
It is interesting to speculate about
the future of the hearsay rule. Of four
brief prophecies, the first relates to the
Wright v. Tathaim kind of problem.
There has been a steady drumfire of
criticism of using the hearsay rule to
exclude evidence of an act nereh, because the act may be equated wiih an
assertion: There was in fact no assertion and no question of truthfulness is
involved. Some writers would apply the
hearsay rule only where it is desired to
test for credibility-that is, only where
an assertion was intended. The contrary
theory' of Wright v. Tathai is undeniably 'logical, but as sometimes applied
it seems to r"1u1counter to common sense.
The Model Code of Evidence of the
American Law Institute, which has been
adopted nowhere, expressly embodies
the principle of Wright v. Tathant. The
Uniform Rules of Evidence impliedly
reject it, while some writers, notably
Professor McCormick, expressly reject it.
The criticism plus the influence of the
new Uniform Rules probably will produce a decline of the rule that conduct
not intended to be assertive may nevertheless be hearsay.
Second, I predict that we shall become less concerned with the sharp
question of admitting or excluding hearsay evidence and that we shall become
more concerned with evaluating the
trustvorthiness of the particular piece of
evidence, letting it in if it carries good
credentials (especially if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness), excluding
it if it looks tenuous and unreliable.
This would mean a difference in treatment between, for example, a carefully
worked out affidavit and multiple hear-

say or gossip, as where A reports what B

told him C said. There already is a
tremendous quantity of hearsay evidence
coiming in under exceptions on the
ground that it is trustworthy. Indeed,
practitioners would do well to be more
alert, even under present rules, to the
difference in probative value of their
proofs. Some lawyers work very hard
at getting the court to accept evidence
which, when all is said and done, was
hardly worth the effort. It was marginal
because it was weak; it was weak because it was marginal. Meanwhile, the
jury's attention unfortunately has been
focused on a weak portion of his case.
Third, there are in fact some differences between treatment of hearsay by
courts sitting with juries and courts without, and there is apparent inevitability
of faster emasculation of the hearsay
rule in judge trials than in jury trials.
There are some judges and scholars
(the terms are not mutually exclusive)
who would be characterized its rather
conservative about the law who advocate
imediate discard of the hearsay rule
in trials to a judge.
Fourth, and last, there is a surprising concurrence among the comnenators
that, like many other exclusionary rules,
the hearsay rule vill eventually disappear. The practice will then be, as is
now the case under continental practice
and in modern Canon ltw, to receive
hearsay and evaluate it. Probably this
can take place only as the judge takes
a somewhat more active role in the conduct of the examination of witnesses.
But there are evidences that this is the
trend. The hearsay rule will not be gone
by tomorrow, or by 1984, or, perhaps,
even by 2057. But I, too, predict that
it will eventually disappear. When that
time comes, we who teach Evidence
may find that our curriculum committees have reduced the Evidence course
to one hour or less, and we shall have
to turn to the teaching of such dreary
subjects as Bills and Notes and Domestic
Relations.
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